When Terra Industries, a Nigerian defence technology startup, recently announced an $11.75 million funding round led by Silicon Valley venture firm 8VC, many celebrated it as a triumph of Nigerian innovation. Co-founded by 22-year-old Nathan Nwachuku and 26-year-old Maxwell Maduka, Terra is currently protecting assets valued at approximately $11 billion across Nigeria—hydropower plants, mines, and critical infrastructure. It seemed like a quintessential success story: brilliant young Nigerians solving Nigerian security problems with cutting-edge technology.
Yet beneath the celebration lies a troubling question: Why did a company protecting Nigerian critical infrastructure have to seek funding from American investors? The easy answer, repeated across tech circles, is that Nigeria’s venture capital ecosystem failed Terra by not providing capital for defence technology. But this narrative fundamentally misdiagnoses the problem. The real culprit isn’t Nigeria’s VC ecosystem—it’s a catastrophically dysfunctional defence budget that makes it structurally impossible for local capital to flow into defence innovation.
Nigeria’s Defence Budget: A Global Outlier
Analysis of Nigeria’s 2026 defence budget reveals an allocation pattern so extreme it qualifies as a global outlier. Of the ₦3.154 trillion allocated to the Ministry of Defence, a staggering 75.8% goes to personnel costs; salaries, pensions, and allowances. Capital expenditure, which covers equipment acquisition, operations, and maintenance, receives a paltry 14.7%. The remaining 9.4% covers overhead costs.
This 76-15 split is not just unusual, it’s aberrant when compared to international standards. In the United Kingdom, personnel costs account for approximately 27% of the defence budget, while equipment and capital expenditure claim 36% or more. Turkey, facing its own significant security challenges, allocates 54% to personnel and 44% to procurement and capital investment. Indonesia has recently shifted its budget structure so that capital expenditure now outpaces personnel costs, with procurement consuming roughly 42% of the defence budget.
Even within NATO, where member states agreed that at least 20% of defence expenditures should be devoted to major equipment spending, the average equipment allocation hovers around 30-35%. Nigeria’s 15% capital allocation falls not just below best practices, but below the minimum threshold that military strategists consider necessary for maintaining operational readiness.
The Paradox: Low Investment, Low Pay
One might assume that with 76% of the budget devoted to personnel, Nigerian military personnel would be among the best-compensated in the world. The reality is precisely the opposite. A Nigerian private earns approximately ₦48,000-49,000 monthly (roughly $30-31 USD), while a sergeant makes about ₦68,000 ($43 USD). Even a captain, a mid-level officer, earns only ₦200,000-230,000 ($125-145 USD) per month. Most officers earn less than ₦100,000 monthly, which military sources have described as insufficient to fulfill daily needs.
For context, a British private earns approximately £1,700 monthly (around $2,125 USD) roughly 70 times what a Nigerian private makes. Even accounting for cost-of-living differences, Nigerian soldiers are dramatically underpaid. Officers have reportedly expressed dissatisfaction when their ration allowance was increased to only ₦2,000 per month when they were expecting ₦5,000.
This creates a perverse paradox: Nigeria has neither well-equipped armed forces nor well-compensated personnel, despite spending three-quarters of its defence budget on salaries and benefits. The money appears to vanish into a bureaucratic black hole of pensions, gratuities, administrative overhead, and structural inefficiencies.
Crucially, Nigeria doesn’t have an unusually large military to justify these personnel costs. With approximately 230,000-280,000 active personnel serving a population of over 220 million, Nigeria’s military-to-population ratio is actually modest compared to countries like Pakistan (650,000 troops for 240 million people), Indonesia (400,000 troops for 275 million people), or Turkey (355,000+ troops for 85 million people).
The Operational Consequences
The implications of this broken budget structure extend far beyond spreadsheets. Nigeria faces multiple active insurgencies—Boko Haram, ISWAP, and various armed groups across the Niger Delta and Middle Belt regions. Effective counter-insurgency operations require sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; modern communications systems; well-maintained armored vehicles; aerial support; and night-vision equipment.
With only 15% of the budget available for capital expenditure, Nigeria’s armed forces suffer from persistent shortfalls in exactly these areas. Reports indicate reliance on aging tanks and armored personnel carriers, limited ISR capabilities, poor radar coverage, and inadequate integration of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. The result is higher casualty rates, lower morale, and reduced operational effectiveness against insurgent groups who increasingly employ drones, improvised explosive devices, and modern asymmetric tactics.
What’s Possible: Learning from Global Models
If Nigeria restructured its defence budget to match Turkey’s allocation model—54% for personnel, 44% for capital and procurement, the strategic possibilities would be transformative. With a total defence budget of ₦3.154 trillion, a 40% capital allocation would yield approximately ₦1.26 trillion for equipment, research and development, and innovation.
From this capital allocation, Nigeria could dedicate ₦360 billion (roughly $450 million) annually to a Defence Innovation Fund—a Nigerian equivalent of DARPA or the UK’s Defence and Security Accelerator. This fund could support 50-100 defence technology startups each year, creating thousands of high-skilled jobs, building sovereign manufacturing capacity, and reducing dependence on foreign defence imports.
Critically, this reallocation wouldn’t impoverish military personnel. Even at 54% of the budget (₦1.7 trillion), there would be more available for salaries than currently exists, allowing for meaningful pay increases while simultaneously investing in equipment and innovation. Turkey demonstrates this is not theoretical, they’ve managed to develop indigenous defence manufacturers like Bayraktar, achieve technology sovereignty, and export to over 30 countries, all while maintaining a professional, adequately compensated military.
Why Nigerian VCs Couldn’t Fund Terra
Critics who blame Nigeria’s venture capital ecosystem for not funding Terra fundamentally misunderstand how venture capital works. VCs invest in markets where they can achieve exits either through acquisitions or public offerings. Nigeria’s VC ecosystem has successfully funded fintech unicorns like Paystack, Flutterwave, and Moniepoint because these companies have clear paths to profitability and exit in competitive commercial markets.
Defence technology operates differently. The primary customer is almost always the government, particularly the military. In countries with healthy defence ecosystems like the United States, Israel, South Korea, Turkey—venture capital flows into defence tech because these governments have structured procurement processes, dedicated innovation budgets, and clear pathways for startups to secure contracts and scale.
When 76% of Nigeria’s defence budget disappears into personnel costs and only 15% remains for all capital needs; equipment-maintenance, operations, AND innovation, there’s simply no market for defence tech startups to sell into. Nigerian VCs aren’t avoiding defence tech because they lack vision; they’re avoiding it because the customer (the Nigerian military) has no budget to buy innovative solutions.
Terra raised $11.75 million from 8VC, Valor Equity Partners, Lux Capital, and SV Angel not because Nigerian investors lack patriotism, but because Silicon Valley investors recognize that Terra can sell to private sector clients protecting infrastructure, and potentially to other African governments markets that exist because Nigeria’s defence establishment cannot serve as an anchor customer.
The Strategic Vulnerability of Foreign Capital Dependency
Here’s where Terra’s success story becomes a cautionary tale about national security. Terra’s American investors placed Alex Moore of 8VC and Eliot Pence, a former Anduril executive, on the company’s board. These are accomplished individuals with deep expertise in defence technology—but they’re American defence veterans now overseeing a company that protects Nigerian hydropower plants, mines, and critical infrastructure.
This creates multiple strategic vulnerabilities. First, board members have insight into Nigeria’s security vulnerabilities, infrastructure locations, and surveillance data. Second, Terra’s proprietary ArtemisOS software “collects, analyzes, and synthesizes data in real time”—data about Nigerian critical infrastructure that flows through a company partially controlled by foreign investors. Third, if U.S.-Nigeria relations deteriorate, or if American strategic interests diverge from Nigerian security needs, these investors could influence Terra’s strategic direction, withdraw funding, or recruit key talent to American companies.
Co-founder Nathan Nwachuku has spoken eloquently about “sovereign intelligence” and reducing African dependence on Western powers for security support. Yet the irony is inescapable: Terra had to accept capital from the very ecosystem it’s trying to reduce dependence on, because Nigeria’s broken defence budget made local funding impossible.
This isn’t just about Terra. It’s about a vicious cycle: Nigeria spends 76% on personnel, leaving nothing for R&D; with no R&D funding, there’s no local defence tech ecosystem; without a local ecosystem, startups seek foreign capital; foreign capital creates strategic dependency; and dependency undermines the sovereignty that a well-funded domestic defence industry would provide.
The Path Forward
Countries that prioritized capital allocation in their defence budgets Turkey, Israel, South Korea, developed indigenous defence industrial bases that generate billions in exports, employ hundreds of thousands of citizens, and serve national interests first. They prove that restructuring defence budgets isn’t just fiscally responsible; it’s strategically essential.
Nigeria needs a fundamental paradigm shift. The current allocation, 76% to personnel who remain underpaid, 15% to capital that can’t meet basic operational needs serves no one. A rebalanced budget modeled on Turkey’s structure (54% personnel, 40% capital) could simultaneously improve military compensation, acquire necessary equipment, and create a Defence Innovation Fund to support companies like Terra.Also huge pension liability should not be seating on defence budget, a veteran affairs department could be created as a separate agency. This frees up more money for capital allocation.
The question isn’t whether Nigeria’s venture capital ecosystem failed Terra Industries. The question is whether Nigeria’s defence establishment will continue failing the next generation of defence innovators—or whether it will restructure its budget to create the market conditions that make local investment in defence technology not just possible, but inevitable.
Terra Industries is protecting $11 billion in Nigerian assets with Nigerian ingenuity. That they had to go to Silicon Valley for funding isn’t a failure of Nigerian entrepreneurship or Nigerian venture capital. It’s a failure of a defence budgeting paradigm so dysfunctional that it inadvertently outsources strategic autonomy while claiming to protect national security. Until that changes, Nigeria’s brightest defence innovators will continue to board planes to San Francisco not because they want to, but because Nigeria’s own defence budget leaves them with no other choice.
Olumide Awoyemi is Founder/CEO of Symmex, an industrial–technological solutions provider and developer of Huraflow.